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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the impact of trust-based working time on firm performance 
using panel data from German establishments. Trust-based working time is a human resource 
management practice that involves a high degree of worker autonomy in terms of scheduling 
individual working time. From the theoretical viewpoint, trust-based working time may affect 
worker motivation positively as well as negatively. Therefore, at the establishment level the 
performance effects of trust-based working time remain an open question. The analysis shows 
that both establishment productivity and profitability increase with the diffusion of trust-based 
working time. Referring only to establishments with trust-based working time arrangements, 
both performance effects are estimated at about 1-2 percent, while in the full sample both per-
formance effects are stronger ranging between about 2.5 and 5 percent.  
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Trust-based working time is not just another flexible working time arrangement. In fact, trust-
based working time can be seen as a means of transition to flexible working hours that in-
volves an increase along two dimensions: working time flexibility and employee discretion. 
To a large extent the allocation of working time is up to the employees concerned. As a con-
sequence, the employer does not need to register and control the employees’ working time 
any longer. Instead, the employer can control whether or not the employee achieves his fixed 
objectives. Hence, trust-based working time implies a shift from input control (recording 
working hours) to output control (recording goal achievement). In the end, therefore, the no-
tion of trust-based working time does not necessarily mean that the employer really trusts the 
employees in terms of not abusing their newly gained working time authority by arbitrarily 
reducing working effort. 
 
In recent years, trust-based working time has become more popular. For example, according 
to estimations of the Cologne Institute for Economic Research, 46 % out of 1,319 interviewed 
companies employ workers facing the conditions of trust-based working time (Institut der 
deutschen Wirtschaft 2010). Graf et al. (2007) determine a slightly lower value for Swiss 
firms. Moreover, 14 % of the employees surveyed report that they are free to set their working 
hours on their own responsibility.  
 
The use of trust-based working time may have positive or negative effects on establishment 
performance largely depending on how employees respond to this kind of working time flexi-
bility. When a high amount of working time discretion contributes to increase worker motiva-
tion or decrease establishment costs, trust-based working time is likely to increase establish-
ment performance. For example, establishments with trust-based working time arrangements 
may effectively reduce direct administrative costs and unit labor costs by eliminating working 
time registration or cutting overtime, respectively. If, however, more working time autonomy 
was associated with increasing counterproductive worker behavior due to inequality issues or 
self-organized work intensification perceived as necessary to achieve the fixed objectives, 
establishment performance would rather be expected to decline. All in all, therefore, from a 
theoretical perspective the impact of trust-based working time on establishment performance 
is heterogeneous and the net effect is ex ante unclear. 
 
The aim of the present paper is to empirically investigate the impact of trust-based working 
time on establishment performance. For this purpose, we use panel data from German estab-
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lishments (the IAB Establishment Panel). Establishment performance is thereby measured by 
both establishment productivity and profitability. Our econometric model is based on a Cobb-
Douglas production function which is augmented by the share of trust-based working time 
workers as our main explanatory variable. Our estimation strategy accounts for potential en-
dogeneity biases caused by unobserved establishment characteristics, reverse causality or se-
lectivity, so the parameter estimates can be viewed as causal effects.  
 
Our paper adds to the existing literature in various ways. To the best of our knowledge, the 
present study is the first that empirically examines the impact of trust-based working time on 
organizational performance using a large-scale establishment-level data set. Furthermore, 
since our parameter estimates can be interpreted as causal effects, our results allow the deriva-
tion of management implications for the effective use of trust-based working time. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
First of all, it has to be mentioned that the use of trust-based working time is likely to affect 
the well-being and wealth of both workers and employer. Thereby, trust-based working time 
may involve beneficial or unfavorable consequences for both labor market parties. The fol-
lowing discussion summarizes the pros and cons of trust-based working time from the per-
spective of the workers and the employer.  
 
According to the job characteristics model of Hackman and Oldham (1976; 1980), the em-
ployees’ work motivation can be improved by job design. Thereby, an appropriate job design 
takes the following job characteristics into account: skill variety, task identity and signifi-
cance, worker autonomy and feedback. The job characteristics model predicts that high de-
grees of these job characteristics are likely to improve working conditions and thus also have 
a positive impact on work morale and job performance. Since trust-based working time is a 
human resource management tool that contributes to improve at least two of these job charac-
teristics just mentioned – i.e., worker autonomy and feedback – we can assume a positive in-
fluence of trust-based working time on worker motivation and performance.1  
 
                                                 
1
 Applying a model of employee attendance, Dalton and Mesch (1990) argue similarly predicting a negative 
relationship between flexible working time arrangements and absenteeism through increases in worker auton-
omy, responsibility and job satisfaction. 
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Another benefit for the workers may result from the change of the establishment’s working 
time culture which accompanies the implementation of trust-based working time (MacEachen 
et al. 2008). The transition from working time registration to a management by objectives 
strategy involves a break with the attendance clock era. This strategy change signals that not 
the workers’ pure attendance time at the firm has to be remunerated but the workers’ goal 
achievement (Böhm et al. 2004). As a result, workers are encouraged to design their working 
time more efficiently and develop a time management that allows them to balance work, lei-
sure and family. Hence, workers may find trust-based working time beneficial, because work-
ing time discretion contributes to improve their work-life balance and may thus increase job 
satisfaction and motivation (Singe and Croucher 2003; MacEachen et al. 2008). In this sense, 
trust-based working time may also be viewed as a gift from the employer that allows employ-
ees to balance their work and life responsibilities (Perry-Smith and Blum 2000; Rau and 
Hyland 2002). In exchange to the employer’s gift, therefore, workers are assumed to respond 
by providing a high effort level.  
 
Similar to this reasoning, Pierce and Newstrom (1980) as well as Baltes et al. (1999) argue 
that employees working under flexible time arrangements can adapt more efficiently to indi-
vidual circadian rhythms and are thus more able to harmonize competing demands. Since 
trust-based working time implies that the employer considers individual preferences and cir-
cadian rhythms to a large extent, the employees’ attitudes and behaviors towards their work 
may be improved leading to higher work morale.  
 
Although the reasoning so far emphasizes the perspective of the workers responding posi-
tively to trust-based working time, it can easily be seen that an increased worker motivation 
caused by a high degree of working time discretion is also likely to have a positive impact on 
organizational performance (Böhm et al. 2004). Consequently, trust-based working time may 
not only be beneficial for the workers concerned but also for the employer via increased es-
tablishment performance measures like productivity, profitability or employee retention 
(Singe and Croucher 2003; Wingen et al. 2004). 
 
Apart from the anticipated positive effects of trust-based working time on establishment per-
formance resulting from positive worker responses there are direct cost effects associated with 
this measure of working time flexibility. First, trust-based working time implies an elimina-
tion of direct administrative costs of working time registration. Second, trust-based working 
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time contributes to lower unit labor costs by cutting overtime. When working time is no 
longer recorded, overtime is reduced or even eliminated by construction (Wingen et al. 2004).  
 
As mentioned earlier, trust-based working time may contribute to improve the work-life bal-
ance of employees by delegating the decision right of working time discretion. Consequently, 
employers can use trust-based working time as a tool for recruiting and retaining qualified 
employees, provided that these employees are interested in scheduling their working time 
autonomously (Singe and Croucher 2003). In this context, trust-based working time is also in 
line with broader societal developments such as the change of the traditional image of the 
family, the increasing labor supply of women and single parents or the change in values and 
increasing diversity of lifestyles. The consideration of these developments within a single 
measure of flexible working hours consequently improves the attractiveness of the company 
for potential employees (Rau and Hyland 2002; Wingen et al. 2004). 
 
Ultimately, the reasoning so far is insistently in line with the hypothesis that trust-based work-
ing time is going to enhance organizational performance, e.g., via increased worker motiva-
tion or the reduction of establishment costs. On the other hand, however, trust-based working 
time might also have a negative impact on establishment performance. For example, increased 
working time discretion may induce an employee to intensify his working effort in order to 
reach the fixed goals. As a result, separating working time from leisure time becomes more 
and more difficult. Moreover, replacing input by output control might put additional pressure 
on the employee who therefore responds by increasing his actual working time and neglecting 
work-life balance issues. However, instead of being more productive, this self-organized work 
intensification may crowd out intrinsic worker motivation and even harm the mental and or-
ganic health of employees. As a consequence, according to this work intensification hypothe-
sis, establishment performance might also be inhibited, for example, by increased absenteeism 
or productivity losses (Singe and Croucher 2003; Wingen et al. 2004; Böhm et al. 2004).  
 
Trust-based working time may also contribute to worsen the organizational climate and is 
then likely to affect organizational performance negatively. This statement can be explained 
by the fact that trust-based working time implies a decoupling of working time and attendance 
time. Under the regime of trust-based working time employees perform less visible for others 
than under the regime of working time registration. As a consequence, trust-based working 
time employees are endangered to be perceived as less productive, less committed or labeled 
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as free riders. Such a situation can lead to mutual monitoring, social conflicts and dysfunc-
tional activities among co-workers, so in the end organizational climate and thus organiza-
tional performance may be harmed substantially (Singe and Croucher 2003; Ngo et al. 2009).2  
 
This reasoning is consistent with equity theory (Adams 1965). According to equity theory 
employees compare their reward-contribution ratio with the corresponding ratio of co-
workers. If the reference worker’s reward-contribution ratio is perceived to exceed the own 
ratio, the concerned worker identifies inequality and can thus be expected to take actions in 
order to reduce perceived inequality. In the present case, trust-based working time employees 
may be perceived as privileged compared to employees working under the regime of time 
registration. In order to respond to perceived inequality workers may act counterproductive, 
for example, by reducing their effort level, so that establishment performance will also be 
affected negatively. 
 
All in all, therefore, the theoretical discussion with respect to the impact of trust-based work-
ing time on firm performance is heterogeneous. Trust-based working time may be associated 
with positive or negative performance effects, so the net effect remains an open question that 
calls for an empirical analysis shedding light on this issue. Before turning to the empirical 
analysis, however, we provide a brief review of the related empirical literature.  
 
Related Literature 
 
Empirical evidence on the performance effects of trust-based working time is scarce. The re-
lated empirical research largely refers to flexible working time arrangements other than trust-
based working time. Roughly speaking the empirical work which is relevant to our study can 
be separated into three areas. At first, there are various studies examining the effects of flexi-
ble working time at the individual level. Other studies explicitly focus on the impact of flexi-
ble working hours on organizational performance. Finally, the third area consists of studies 
that investigate the effects of trust-based working time on individual and firm performance.  
 
The first stream of related literature addresses the impact of flexible working time on out-
comes measured at the worker level. The adaption of flexible working time arrangements af-
                                                 
2
 Furthermore, such a corporate culture may encourage employees who have the option for trust-based working 
time not to make use of it since they expect negative consequences for their career opportunities or regarding 
their perceived commitment. 
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fects employment and work organization patterns and thus the employees concerned (De 
Menezes and Kelliher 2011; Beauregard and Henry 2009; Perry-Smith and Blum 2000). 
Many empirical studies reveal a positive impact of flexible working time arrangements on 
employee performance (Baltes et al. 1999; Kauffeld et al. 2004), attitudinal and behavioral 
outcomes like job satisfaction, worker well-being and motivation (McNall et al. 2010; Scan-
dura and Lankau 1997) and wages (Winder 2009; Beblo et al. 2004). The main argument in 
this context is that flexible working time improves the employees’ work-life balance which in 
turn increases their motivation and productivity. On the other hand, there are studies finding 
negative effects of flexible working time on worker outcomes like health and well-being 
(Janssen and Nachreiner 2004) as well as work-life balance (Baltes et al. 1999). An explana-
tion for this finding is that flexible arrangements of work hours are often subject to company 
control and decision, so these arrangements involve only little worker autonomy. All in all, 
therefore, the effects of flexible working time on worker performance largely depend on the 
fact whether or not working time flexibility is accompanied by worker autonomy (Stavrou 
and Kilaniotis 2010). 
 
The studies of Askenazy and Caroli (2006) as well as Origo and Pagani (2008) investigate the 
influence of flexible working time on employee outcomes in the context of a series of innova-
tive work practices such as part-time work, employee involvement, job rotation, work auton-
omy and teamwork. Regarding the impact on working conditions and subjective well-being at 
work, Askenazy and Caroli (2006) find that flexible working times are associated with more 
mental strain and greater time pressure which supports the work intensification hypothesis. 
Similarly, Origo and Pagani (2008) obtain no or negative effects of flexible working hours 
and other forms of quantitative workplace flexibility on job satisfaction, while they find a 
positive impact of employee involvement, work autonomy and other forms of qualitative 
workplace flexibility. This finding suggests a complementary relationship between flexible 
working hours and worker autonomy. 
 
Another stream of empirical literature considers the influence of flexible working time ar-
rangements on a range of organizational performance measures. In this context, some studies 
show that firms providing flexible working time arrangements may benefit from reductions in 
absenteeism and labor turnover (Stavrou and Kilaniotis 2010; Konrad and Mangel 2000; Stav-
rou 2005). This finding can again be explained with an improved work motivation resulting 
from the delegation of working time discretion. In line with this reasoning, other studies find 
  
7 
that firms offering flexible working time arrangements are less likely to have problems in 
terms of recruiting skilled workers (Rau and Hyland 2002; Dalton and Mesch 1990).  
 
In a recent study, Muehler and Steffes (2011) analyze the relationship between various human 
resource practices and employee retention. Thereby, the human resource practice ‘working 
time flexibility’ also includes trust-based working time. The most important result for our 
purposes is a positive link between flexible working times and employee retention. Consistent 
with the reasoning pointed out above this result can be explained by increased job satisfaction 
resulting from improved time discretion. However, since trust-based working time in this 
study is seen as a part of a coherent system of human resource practices, an isolated effect 
cannot be identified exactly. 
 
Moreover, there are studies that focus on the impact of flexible working time on direct per-
formance measures like firm productivity (Shepard III et. al. 1996; Konrad and Mangel 2000; 
Bloom et al. 2011) firm efficiency (Wolf and Beblo 2004; Kerkhofs et. al. 2008; Perry-Smith 
and Blum 2000) and financial performance (Sands and Harper 2007; Arthur 2003). These 
studies find quite mixed effects that largely depend on the specific type of flexible working 
time arrangement as well as the concrete measure of organizational performance. Further-
more, there are differences with respect to the empirical strategy and data availability. For 
example, Shepard III et al. (1996) find that flexible working time increases firm productivity 
by about 10 percent. This study, however, is restricted to the pharmaceutical sector and addi-
tionally lacks from not accounting for other human resource practices that are possibly corre-
lated with the use of flexible working time. In contrast, the data used in the study of Wolf and 
Beblo (2004) provide detailed information about other human resource practices that are often 
implemented together with flexible working hours, so the authors can disentangle diverse ef-
fects resulting from flexible working times and other human resource practices. Their main 
finding is that moderate working time flexibility is positively related to firm efficiency, while 
stronger working time flexibility seem to have a negative impact. The authors conclude, how-
ever, that their results should not be interpreted in terms of causal effects.  
 
Similar to the studies at the individual-level, the empirical studies at the firm-level do also 
often differ with respect to the conceptualization of flexible working time arrangements. More 
precisely, working time flexibility is often analyzed in the context of family-friendly work-
place practices (Perry-Smith and Blum 2000; McNall et al. 2010; Bloom et al. 2011) or high 
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performance work systems including practices such as the reduction of hierarchies, employee 
involvement and autonomy or self-managed work groups. Here, various studies identify sig-
nificant complementarities between broadly defined flexible workplace practices regarding 
firm performance (e.g., MacDuffie 1995; Wolf and Zwick 2002; White et al. 2003).  
 
Finally, a third stream of literature relates to studies that explicitly focus on the relationship 
between trust-based working time and individual or firm performance. As already mentioned, 
empirical evidence on this topic is really scarce. Furthermore, to a large extent the inference 
of performance effects is derived from business case studies and interviews of employees and 
managers in terms of their experiences with trust-based working time. For example, 
MacEachen et al. (2008) find qualitative evidence for increasing working intensity caused by 
trust-based working time. Moreover, Wingen et al. (2004) as well as Neubert and Thomas 
(2005) detect a positive effect of trust-based working time on performance measures like em-
ployee satisfaction, productivity, customer orientation or declining absenteeism. In contrast, 
Böhm et al. (2004) and Haipeter (2001) do not identify a clear trend. On the one hand, posi-
tive performance effects can be observed caused by enhanced worker autonomy and a chang-
ing corporate working time culture. On the other hand, some evidence is consistent with the 
work intensification hypothesis. However, due to small sample sizes or the case study charac-
ter of the analyses these results fail to be representative. 
 
From a methodological perspective the study of Hanglberger (2010) is quite near to our 
analysis. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel and specifying a fixed effects model, the 
author estimates the impact of flexible working time arrangements – including trust-based 
working time – on employee job satisfaction. The most important result from our viewpoint is 
a positive effect of trust-based working time on employee job satisfaction. However, contrary 
to our study, Hanglberger (2010) does not account for reverse causality or selectivity. More-
over, his analysis is based on individual-level data, while our study uses establishment-level 
data.  
 
To sum up, the empirical literature on the impact of flexible working hours on individual or 
firm performance is not unambiguous. There a several reasons for this impression. Most im-
portantly, the spectrum of flexible working time arrangements is quite large containing a se-
ries of single practices that are relatively heterogeneous. Trust-based working time is one of 
these practices. As a result, the performance effects of working time flexibility largely depend 
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on the specific working time measure. They cannot be generalized or transferred to other 
measures of working time flexibility (De Menezes and Kelliher 2011; Beauregard and Henry 
2009).  
 
Given these mixed and less clear-cut results, the empirical evidence so far is not able to shed 
light on the impact of trust-based working time on establishment performance. To the best of 
our knowledge, our study is the first that empirically examines the performance effects of 
trust-based working time using a large-scale data set at the establishment-level. Moreover, 
none of the existing studies on the effects of trust-based working time take the potential en-
dogeneity of this kind of working time flexibility into account. As a result, the estimated ef-
fects of trust-based working time cannot be interpreted as causal effects, but represent simple 
correlations instead.3 At the establishment level, however, the implementation of trust-based 
working time is likely to be endogenous, since establishments using this measure of working 
time flexibility can be expected to differ systematically from non-using establishments. For 
example, successful establishments may be more likely to implement trust-based working 
time arrangements, so trust-based working time itself may be a function of establishment per-
formance. Therefore, an important objective of our empirical investigation is to control for 
selectivity biases and unobserved firm characteristics using panel data and applying appropri-
ate estimation methods.4 In this sense, our paper should add quite substantially to the empiri-
cal literature on the performance effects of trust-based working time. 
 
Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In our study, we use the establishment panel data of the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB). The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of over 15,000 establishments of all 
size classes and industries, which makes it being the most extensive establishment-level data 
set in Germany. The firms are selected from a parent sample of all German establishments 
that employ at least one employee covered by social security. This parent sample can be con-
sidered as complete, because firms have to report about their employees under social security 
by law. The selection method is stratification with respect to ten categories of establishment 
size and 16 economic sectors. This is why an establishment’s probability of being selected 
                                                 
3
 The study of Hanglberger (2010) is an exception to this statement, because the author at least controls for un-
observed (time-constant) individual characteristics.  
4
 In fact, the lack of empirical work that allows the derivation of causal performance effects of flexible working 
time arrangements has recently been criticized by De Menezes and Kelliher (2011), Beauregard and Henry 
(2009) as well as Stavrou and Kilaniotis (2010).  
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increases with employment. Hence, the IAB Establishment Panel is approximately propor-
tional to employment and therefore representative for the German economy. A large set of 
questions are covered periodically, such as employment and wages, sales, investments, inter-
national trade, innovations, organizational change, worker representation, as well as voca-
tional and continuing training. Additionally, special topics are covered by the questionnaire 
every year. For example, the incidence of trust-based working time is covered regularly every 
two years since 2004, while the diffusion of trust-based working time is solely covered in the 
panel wave of 2006.5  
 
In order to estimate the impact of trust-based working time on organizational performance we 
use both establishment productivity (measured as total sales) and establishment profitability 
(measured as total sales minus wage bill) as performance measures. Our key explanatory vari-
able is the diffusion of trust-based working time captured by the number of employees work-
ing under the regime of trust-based working time relative to total employment. Finally, we use 
a set of control variables that are quite common in estimating the performance effects of cer-
tain human resource management practices within a production function framework of the 
Cobb-Douglas type. Note that the vector of control variables also contains various measures 
of working time arrangements other than trust-based working time. Herewith, we take some 
of the related literature into account indicating that the implementation of a certain innovative 
work practice is often accompanied by other human resource practices. Hence, this proceed-
ing enables a more precise estimation of the isolated performance effect of trust-based work-
ing time. Table A1 in the appendix provides the definitions and descriptive statistics of the 
complete set of variables used in this study. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 provide some descriptive information on the incidence of trust-based working 
time within selected industries and establishment size classes.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
The statistics in figures 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate that trust-based working time has been 
becoming more and more popular irrespective of sector affiliation and firm size. However, 
banks and insurance companies are especially likely to offer trust-based working time ar-
rangements to their employees. More than 50 % of the firms in this industry apply this in-
                                                 
5
 For an introduction to the IAB Establishment Panel see Fischer et al. (2009). 
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strument of working time flexibility followed by establishments of the sectors firm-related 
services as well as mining and energy, where almost 40 % have implemented a trust-based 
working time arrangement. Apart from the positive time effect, Figure 2 additionally demon-
strates that the incidence of trust-based working time increases with establishment size.  
 
Figure 3 displays the diffusion of trust-based working time depending on establishment size. 
Thereby, the displayed values represent the share of workers with trust-based working time 
arrangements in establishments that have already implemented this measure of working time 
flexibility. Not surprisingly, there is an inverse relationship between the proportion of trust-
based working time employees and establishment size. Note, however, that the share of trust-
based working time employees appears to remain quite stable at a level of almost 15 % in 
establishments with more than 100 employees.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Econometric Model 
 
In order to estimate the performance effects of trust-based working time, we specify a Cobb-
Douglas production function which is augmented by the share of trust-based working time 
employees relative to total employment, T% , and a set of control variables X . Our basic 
econometric model, therefore, is  
 
,%lnlnln 210 ittiititititit uXTLKP +++′++++= ξµδγβββ    (1) 
 
where P  is our performance measure of establishment i  at time t . In total, we apply two 
performance measures: Y  is total sales and serves as a measure for establishment productiv-
ity, while WY −  is total sales minus wage bill representing a measure for establishment prof-
itability. Furthermore, K  represents capital stock (measured as total investments), L  de-
scribes the input factor labor (number of employees), and u  is an error term with zero mean 
and finite variance. Finally, tξ  represents cyclical fluctuations captured by a set of time 
dummies and iµ  reflects unobserved time-invariant establishment characteristics. The pa-
rameter of interest to be estimated is γ .  
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Our estimation strategy aims at addressing the potential endogeneity of trust-based working 
time use. Thereby, we treat the establishment’s diffusion of trust-based working time as an 
endogenous explanatory variable in the production function. Ignoring endogeneity issues 
would probably lead to a biased and inconsistent estimate of γ  in equation (1), because estab-
lishments are likely to differ systematically in their propensity to adopt trust-based working 
time based on observed and unobserved factors. For example, an establishment’s decision to 
implement trust-based working time may depend on the skill structure of its workforce as well 
as performance or business cycle issues. Therefore, our econometric model is a structural 
model approach that allows for observed and unobserved time-varying establishment charac-
teristics. Specifically, we estimate the following two-equation system: 
 
.%lnln%
%lnlnln
2121
21
iiijkiiiii
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ηpiηϕϕψθθ
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Here, the first equation in (2) is the structural equation, while the second equation in (2) is the 
reduced-form (or first-stage) equation. Note that Z  includes all explanatory variables speci-
fied for the structural equation and additionally contains two exclusion restrictions, M  and 
T% , as identifying instrumental variables. The parameters are estimated using the two-stage 
least squares estimator (2SLS), where the coefficient γ  in the structural equation is of par-
ticular interest. Since the model in (2) is overidentified with one overidentifying restriction, 
we can test the validity, i.e., relevance and exogeneity of the applied instruments.  
 
To be valid instruments, the exclusion restrictions must significantly contribute to determine 
an establishment’s share of trust-based working time employees T%  without being correlated 
with the error term iu  in the structural equation. Here, M  is a dummy variable measuring 
whether or not an establishment applies formalized goal-setting processes according to a 
management by objectives approach. As explained above, the introduction of trust-based 
working time implies a change from input control to output control. Consequently, there 
should be a strong positive relationship between M  and T% . Moreover, we apply the group-
specific mean of trust-based working time diffusion T%  as a technical instrument for an es-
tablishment’s actual diffusion regarding trust-based working time, i.e., the share of trust-based 
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working time employees.6 In our case, a group is determined by establishment size class j  
and sector affiliation k .7 jkT%  is correlated with iT%  by construction, but there is no reason 
to expect that it has an influence on establishment performance in any other way than through 
its effect on the actual share of trust-based working time employees of this specific establish-
ment, i.e., iT% . Hence, we use one instrument in substance ( M ) and one technical instrument 
( T% ) to identify the model parameters.  
 
The instrumental variables approach displayed in equation (2) explicitly accounts for potential 
endogeneity issues like selectivity and reverse causality. However, some studies apply estima-
tion strategies that additionally control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity in the pro-
duction function. Since our key explanatory variable T% , i.e., the share of trust-based work-
ing time employees, is only available in the panel wave of 2006, we cannot account for unob-
served establishment heterogeneity estimating a conventional fixed effects model. However, 
an appropriate solution in this case has been proposed by Black and Lynch (2001).8 Applying 
their two-step estimation strategy allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in a situa-
tion, where the core explanatory variable is only available in one panel wave.  
 
According to the first step of the Black and Lynch approach, we estimate a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function using the within estimator. This Cobb-Douglas function is aug-
mented by year and sector dummies to control for cyclical shocks and sectoral developments. 
Hence, the first-stage estimation equation can be written as 
 
,lnlnln 210 itiittititit uISLKP ++′+′+++= µλαβββ     (3) 
 
where the vector S  contains the year dummies and I  denotes sector affiliation. From the 
estimates of equation (3) we calculate the establishment-specific, time-invariant component of 
the residual, i.e.,  
 
,
ˆ
ˆlnˆlnˆlnˆ 21 iiiii ISLKP λαββµ ′−′−−−=       (4) 
                                                 
6
 In a similar way group-specific means have also been used as technical instruments, for example, in Woess-
mann and West (2006) and Mueller (2009). Thereby, Woessmann and West (2006) are interested in estimating 
the effects of class-size on student performance, while Mueller (2009) focuses on the productivity effects of 
works councils in Germany. 
7
 All in all, we defined six establishment size classes and eight economic sectors.  
8
 The Black and Lynch estimation approach has previously been applied, for example, in Zwick (2004; 2005).  
  
14 
 
where the bars over the respective variables represent average values over time. The estab-
lishment fixed effect iµˆ  measures whether individual performance structurally exceeds or 
falls below the performance of other establishments. In the second step, iµˆ  is regressed on the 
trust-based working time variable T%  and a set of (quasi-fixed) control variables X :  
 
,%ˆ iiii XT εδγµ +′+=         (5) 
 
where iε  is an i.i.d. random variable. The coefficient γ  is of particular interest, because its 
estimate represents the impact of the internal diffusion of trust-based working time on the 
fixed effect of an establishment’s performance. The parameters in equation (5) are estimated 
by conventional ordinary least squares.  
 
In order to simultaneously account for both selectivity and unobserved establishment hetero-
geneity in the production function, we combine the Black and Lynch approach with our struc-
tural model approach in equation (2) and yield   
 
.%%
%ˆ
21 ijkiii
iiii
TMXT
uXT
ηϕϕψ
δγµ
+++′=
+′+=
      (6) 
 
In the end, the estimate of γ  is the causal effect of trust-based working time diffusion on es-
tablishment performance.  
 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 displays the performance effects of trust-based working time (parameter γ ) applying 
different estimation techniques.9 The cross-section OLS estimates for equation (1) thereby 
serve as a reference for the estimates resulting from 2SLS as well as 2SLS in combination 
with the Black and Lynch approach (equations (2) or (6), respectively). Table 1 displays the 
                                                 
9
 In our analysis we exclude non-profit establishments and the public sector. Furthermore, we exclude establish-
ments of the banking and insurance sector because our dependent variables are based on total sales. However, 
since the corresponding measure for banks and insurance companies is based on total assets instead of total sales, 
we decided not to consider these companies in our analysis.  
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estimates for the full sample and a restricted sample including only the establishments with 
trust-based working time arrangements.10 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The OLS estimates reveal an economically quite modest, albeit highly significant perform-
ance effect of trust-based working time diffusion with a magnitude of 0.3 percent. Thus, a one 
percent increase in the share of trust-based working time employees would be associated with 
a 0.3 percent increase in establishment performance. This holds for both performance meas-
ures, i.e., productivity and profitability, and is irrespective of whether we use the full or the 
restricted sample. However, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent as the 
OLS approach does not account for the potential endogenous nature of the trust-based work-
ing time variable.  
 
The potential endogeneity of trust-based working time diffusion is explicitly addressed using 
2SLS and its combination with the Black and Lynch approach.11 First of all, the necessity to 
account for an endogenous diffusion of trust-based working time within establishments is 
strongly indicated by Wooldridge’s robust score test (Wooldridge 1995) that – with one ex-
ception – rejects the null hypothesis of T%  to be exogenous. Looking at the parameter esti-
mates, we can see a considerable increase of the coefficient for the share of trust-based work-
ing time employees relative to the OLS estimates. More precisely, the performance effect 
rises to about five to six percent in the full sample, at which the profitability effect is even 
slightly higher than the productivity effect. In the restricted sample, however, which includes 
only the establishments offering trust-based working time arrangements to their employees, 
we obtain a performance effect of about one or two percent.12 These estimates point to quite 
large performance differences between establishments with and without trust-based working 
                                                 
10
 The OLS estimates of the input factors K and L as well as the control variables can be found in Table A2 in the 
appendix. The first-stage estimates resulting from the 2SLS approach are displayed in Table A3 in the appendix. 
The first-stage estimates according to the Black and Lynch approach are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix. 
All remaining estimates are available from the authors upon request.  
11
 Note that the moderate sample size reduction from 7,999 (855) to 7,693 (823) displayed in Table 1 is caused 
by the use of the exclusion restrictions.  
12
 These performance effects are substantially smaller than the performance effect obtained in the study of 
Shepard III et al. (1996) who found that flexible working time increases firm productivity by about 10 percent. 
Although the authors of this study also apply an instrumental variables estimation strategy, one should be careful 
in terms of comparing the results. As mentioned in the related literature section, the study of Shepard III et al. 
(1996) is restricted to the pharmaceutical sector, while our analysis covers all sectors apart from banks and in-
surance companies as well as the public and non-profit sector. Moreover, Shepard III et al. (1996) consider the 
productivity effects of working time flexibility in general and do not explicitly focus on trust-based working 
time. 
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time arrangements. More precisely, the performance differences in the two samples suggest 
that high performance establishments are more likely to implement trust-based working time 
than weak performing establishments.13  
 
The informative value of the 2SLS estimates largely depends on the validity of the considered 
exclusion restrictions. Looking first at the parameter estimates of the exclusion restrictions 
displayed in Table A3 in the appendix, we can see that both instruments are highly significant 
and thus relevant. Moreover, they exhibit the expected positive sign. The relevance of the 
instrumental variables is confirmed by the diagnostic F  test displayed in Table 1. This F  
test checks for joint significance of the chosen exclusion restrictions in the reduced-form 
equation. The F  statistic is always highly significant and even conforms to the often claimed 
rule of thumb, i.e., 10>F . Finally, the exclusion restrictions can be considered as exogenous. 
This result is provided by Wooldridge’s robust score test of overidentifying restrictions 
(Wooldridge 1995) which is – leaving aside one exception – insignificant at the 5 % level. 
Hence, the diagnostic tests support the validity of the exclusion restrictions and thus the in-
formative value of the (combined) 2SLS estimates. All in all, therefore, our empirical results 
are consistent with the work motivation hypothesis emphasizing the benefits of trust-based 
working time for both workers and establishments. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section we run additional regressions that are intended to check the robustness of our 
estimation results presented previously. Thereby, we examine whether our results are affected 
by the application of an imputation technique that aims at addressing a potential missing value 
problem with regard to our key explanatory variable T% . The missing value problem may 
result from the fact that information about the share of employees with trust-based working 
time arrangements is only requested from those establishments that use trust-based working 
time just in some areas or departments. Unfortunately, the corresponding information from 
establishments applying trust-based working time for the entire establishment is not re-
quested. As a consequence, a substantial number of establishments that definitely use trust-
                                                 
13
 This interpretation is confirmed by the results of a complementing regression analysis, where we estimate the 
performance effects of trust-based working time diffusion applying an endogenous switching regression model. 
Here, we find that in both performance equations the respective coefficients for inverse Mill’s ratio are negative 
and highly significant which suggests that high performing establishments are systematically more likely to 
apply trust-based working time than their lower performing counterparts. 
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based working time arrangements is excluded from providing information on the internal dif-
fusion of trust-based working time. This scenario may even cause a sample selection bias.  
 
We respond to this problem by predicting the missing shares of trust-based working time em-
ployees from the information provided by establishments using trust-based working time just 
in some areas of the establishment. Thereby, we assume that establishments with a company-
wide application of trust-based working time are more likely to employ a higher fraction of 
trust-based working time employees than establishments with a quite selective use of this 
practice. Our further proceeding can then be described in three steps. At first, we group the 
establishments with respect to establishment size class j  and sector affiliation k . In the sec-
ond step, we calculate the 75 percent and the 90 percent quantil of our variable of interest, i.e., 
T%  for each of the groups using the available information from the establishments with a 
selective use of trust-based working time. Finally, we replace the missing values for the estab-
lishments with a company-wide trust-based working time use by imputing the respective 
quantiles obtained for every group. All in all, therefore, this imputation strategy is a conven-
ient procedure to address the described missing value problem adequately.14   
 
The application of the imputation technique just introduced allows us to increase the number 
of observations for our main explanatory variable T%  by 735 establishments from 7,999 to 
8,734 (all establishments) or from 855 to 1,590 (establishments with trust-based working time 
arrangements), respectively. However, the use of the two exclusion restrictions M  and T%  
required for the 2SLS estimations again slightly reduces effective sample size to 8,386 (all 
establishments) or 1,516 (establishments with trust-based working time arrangements), re-
spectively. 
 
With regard to the estimation strategy we proceed analogously to our approach in the previous 
section and estimate the equation system 
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14
 We decided to apply this imputation technique as potential alternatives using predictions from regression or 
interpolation methods exhibit some limitations. See Cameron and Trivedi (2010, p. 47). The present scenario, for 
example, requires an imputation technique accounting for the fact that we observe missing values just for those 
establishments which are especially likely to employ large fractions of trust-based working time workers.  
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where q  describes the respective quantil, i.e., =q 75, 90. Table 2 displays the resulting 2SLS 
estimates of γ  for our modified main explanatory variables 75%T  and 90%T .15  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The second-stage estimates for 75%T  and 90%T  largely confirm the results discussed in the 
previous section. After controlling for an endogenous diffusion of trust-based working time 
within a structural model approach both the productivity and the profitability effect are posi-
tive and highly significant. Interestingly, in those specifications applying the full sample the 
profitability effect slightly exceeds the productivity effect, which indicates a small negative 
wage bill effect of trust-based working time diffusion.16  
 
Comparing the point estimates for 75%T  and 90%T  with the corresponding estimate for T%  
in the previous section, we find slightly smaller values for 75%T  and 90%T  than for T% . 
This outcome might be interpreted as an indication for diminishing marginal returns. Both 
75%T  and 90%T  represent variables, where the missing values for those establishments with 
a company-wide use of trust-based working time arrangements are replaced by the group-
specific 75 or 90 percent quantil. Hence, this imputation procedure is associated with an in-
creasing average share of trust-based working time employees relative to the shares measured 
by T% . According to our findings, relatively moderate proportions of trust-based working 
time employees are associated with slightly higher performance effects than higher employ-
ment shares generated by the imputation technique. However, we abstain from interpreting 
this finding in terms of a non-linear (concave) performance effect for two reasons. First, the 
results of this section are substantially based on imputed values added to actual observations. 
Second, we observe that the performance effects of 90%T  slightly exceed those obtained for 
75%T . This finding, however, is not consistent with a concave performance effect of trust-
based working time diffusion.  
 
                                                 
15
 The first-stage estimates and the second-stage estimates of the covariates are available from the authors upon 
request.  
16
 However, additional 2SLS wage bill estimations do not support this statement. The wage effect of trust-based 
working time diffusion turns out to be very small and mostly insignificant.   
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The diagnostic tests conducted to check the endogeneity problem as well as the validity of the 
considered exclusion restrictions provide comparable results to those obtained in the previous 
section. Note, however, that in the sample including only the trust-based working time estab-
lishments the estimated productivity effects might suffer from an endogeneity problem con-
cerning the exclusion restrictions. Here, the robust score test of overidentifying restrictions 
rejects the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments at the 5 percent level, so the correspond-
ing point estimates should be interpreted cautiously. As an alternative, however, we consider 
the 2SLS estimates resulting from equation (2), where T%  is replaced by 75%T  or 90%T  
and T%  is replaced by 75%T  or 90%T , respectively. In the end, the resulting point estimates 
are very similar to those displayed in Table 2. This holds for both magnitude (0.009 and 
0.007) and significance. However, the robust score test of overidentifying restrictions does no 
longer reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments ( 193.22 =χ , 138.0=p  and 
457.22 =χ , 117.0=p ), which indicates the validity of our instruments in this case. All in 
all, therefore, the results of our sensitivity analysis support the estimates in the previous sec-
tion. Hence, we conclude that our findings are insistently in line with the work motivation 
hypothesis emphasizing the beneficial consequences of trust-based working time for the 
workers concerned and thus the respective establishments. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we empirically examine the impact of trust-based working time on firm perform-
ance using German establishment-level panel data. The implementation of trust-based work-
ing time is associated with a high degree of worker autonomy with regard to scheduling indi-
vidual working time. Theoretically, workers may respond positively as well as negatively to 
their newly gained time flexibility depending on whether trust-based working time increases 
or declines individual worker motivation.  
 
Based on an augmented Cobb Douglas production function we find that both establishment 
productivity and profitability increase with the diffusion of trust-based working time to a 
similar extent. Thereby, the estimated performance effects range between about 2.5 and 5 
percent, when we consider all establishments in the sample. However, when we restrict our 
analysis to establishments offering trust-based working time arrangements at all, both per-
formance effects reduce to about 1-2 percent. This performance difference in the two samples 
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suggests that high performance establishments are more likely to implement trust-based work-
ing time than weak performing establishments. All in all, therefore, our results insistently con-
firm the work motivation hypothesis assuming positive consequences of trust-based working 
time for the well-being and wealth of workers and establishments. 
 
Our estimation strategy accounts for the potential endogeneity of trust-based working time 
diffusion by explicitly addressing unobserved establishment characteristics, reverse causality 
and selectivity. For this purpose, we combine the 2SLS method with a two-step estimation 
approach suggested by Black and Lynch (2001). As a consequence, therefore, the parameter 
estimates can be viewed as causal effects. Moreover, we apply an imputation strategy to over-
come a potential missing value problem arising from the construction of the respective ques-
tions about trust-based working time issues in the questionnaire. The results of the regressions 
applying the imputation technique strongly support our previous estimates with respect to the 
performance effects of trust-based working time diffusion, so we conclude that our results are 
robust.  
 
The results of our study provide some important management implications for establishments 
reflecting upon the introduction or extension of trust-based working time arrangements. Most 
importantly, trust-based working time appears to be a valuable human resource practice, so 
employers can be encouraged to adopt or even intensify trust-based working time arrange-
ments.  
 
The remaining implications follow from the first-stage estimations of our instrumental vari-
ables approach which are displayed in Table A3 in the appendix. First, there is a complemen-
tary relationship between trust-based working time and some other practices of working time 
flexibility. Hence, trust-based working time can be integrated to a system of flexible working 
time practices that includes changes in the working time of part-time workers, the introduc-
tion of working time corridors or shifted working times.  
 
Second, there is a strong correlation between the diffusion of trust-based working time and a 
skilled workforce. This suggests that trust-based working time is especially productive in 
firms employing relatively high shares of skilled workers. In other words, firms with a high 
share of low-skilled workers should be careful regarding the implementation of trust-based 
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working time. Perhaps these firms are better off when they maintain the traditional regime of 
working time registration.  
 
Finally, firms facing worker representations, i.e., unions and works councils, are encouraged 
to look for a constructive dialogue with these institutions as according to our first-stage esti-
mations unions and works councils obviously tend to oppose the introduction or diffusion of 
trust-based working time. A possible explanation for this finding is that worker representa-
tives believe in the work intensification hypothesis discussed above. Although our results in 
the present study do not support the work intensification hypothesis, additional empirical 
work has to be done to draw more precise conclusions in this respect. For example, examining 
the impact of trust-based working time on workers’ health would contribute substantially to 
discriminate between the work intensification and work motivation hypothesis.  
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Figure 1. Incidence of Trust-Based Working Time by Sector Affiliation 
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Note: The displayed values are percentages. The calculations are restricted to establishments that do not provide 
item non-responses for the subsequent regression analysis. Due to data protection the share of establishments 
in the public sector / non-profit organizations must not be displayed for 2008. Sample size in 2004 (2008) is 
10,741 (9,252). 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2004 and 2008, own calculations.  
 
 
Figure 2. Incidence of Trust-Based Working Time by Establishment Size (Number of Em-
ployees) 
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Note: The displayed values are percentages. The calculations are restricted to establishments that do not provide 
item non-responses for the subsequent regression analysis. Sample size in 2004 (2008) is 10,741 (9,252). 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2004 and 2008, own calculations.  
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Figure 3. Diffusion of Trust-Based Working Time by Establishment Size 
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Proportion of trust-based working time employees
 
Note: The displayed values are percentages. The calculations are restricted to establishments that do not provide 
item non-responses for the subsequent regression analysis. Sample size is 855. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2006, own calculations.  
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Table 1. Performance Effects of Trust-Based Working Time Diffusion 
Estimation strategy OLS 2SLS 2SLS combined with Black & Lynch approach 
 
All estab-
lishments 
Trust-based 
working 
time estab-
lishments 
All estab-
lishments 
Trust-based 
working 
time estab-
lishments 
All estab-
lishments 
Trust-based 
working 
time estab-
lishments 
Model specification (1) (1) (2) (2) (6) (6) 
Dependent variable: ln Y       
%T 0.003*** 
(0.007) 
0.003** 
(0.037) 
0.056*** 
(0.001) 
0.013**  
(0.033) 
0.050*** 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Score test (endogeneity)   26.977*** 
(0.000) 
3.647* 
(0.056) 
24.358*** 
(0.000) 
7.119*** 
(0.007) 
F test (instrument relevance)   11.284*** 
(0.000) 
29.425*** 
(0.000) 
11.284*** 
(0.000) 
18.531*** 
(0.000) 
Score test (overidentification)   3.155* 
(0.075) 
2.154 
(0.142) 
2.432 
(0.118) 
4.128** 
(0.042) 
Number of observations 7,999 855 7,693 823 7.693 823 
Dependent variable: ln (Y
 
–W)       
%T 0.003** 
(0.035) 
0.003* 
(0.070) 
0.067*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*  
(0.077) 
0.062*** 
(0.001) 
0.022***  
(0.010) 
Score test (endogeneity)   31.425*** 
(0.000) 
2.242 
(0.134) 
29.569*** 
(0.000) 
5.093** 
(0.024) 
F test (instrument relevance)   11.284*** 
(0.000) 
29425*** 
(0.000) 
11.284*** 
(0.000) 
18.531*** 
(0.000) 
Score test (overidentification)   0.449 
(0.502) 
0.457 
(0.498) 
0.414 
(0.519) 
1.965 
(0.161) 
Number of observations 7,999 855 7,693 823 7,693 823 
Note: The values in parentheses represent p-values calculated on the basis of robust standard errors. The specifi-
cations additionally contain a set of covariates controlling for input factors capital and labor, the structure of the 
workforce, technological innovations, international trade, worker representation, working time flexibility, re-
gional and sectoral affiliation as well as other establishment characteristics. For more precise information see the 
estimates of the covariates displayed in Table A2 in the appendix.  
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2000 – 2008, own calculations. 
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Table 2. Performance Effects of Trust-Based Working Time (Specification Using Imputed 
Values) 
Estimation strategy 2SLS combined with Black & Lynch approach 
Dependent variable ln Y ln (Y
 
–W) 
 All establishments 
Trust-based work-
ing time estab-
lishments 
All establishments 
Trust-based work-
ing time estab-
lishments 
Model specification (7) (7) (7) (7) 
%T 75 0.027***    
(0.000) 
0.012***      
(0.001) 
0.044***    
(0.000) 
0.013***        
(0.003) 
Score test (endogeneity) 26.775***  
(0.000) 
7.299***    
(0.006) 
44.098***  
(0.000) 
5.672**      
(0.017) 
F test (instrument relevance) 36.541***  
(0.000) 
76.711***  
(0.000) 
36.541***  
(0.000) 
76.711***  
(0.000) 
Score test (overidentification) 3.045*        
(0.081) 
4.239**      
(0.039) 
0.025          
(0.872) 
1.351          
(0.245) 
Number of observations 8,386 1,516 8,386 1,516 
%T 90 0.036***    
(0.000) 
0.009**          
(0.017) 
0.053***    
(0.000) 
0.009*          
(0.059) 
Score test (endogeneity) 44.193***  
(0.000) 
4.379**      
(0.036) 
54.039***  
(0.000) 
2.635          
(0.104) 
F test (instrument relevance) 23.044***  
(0.000) 
46.510***  
(0.000) 
23.044***  
(0.000) 
46.510***  
(0.000) 
Score test (overidentification) 0.195          
(0.658) 
4.917**      
(0.026) 
0.557          
(0.455) 
1.766          
(0.183) 
Number of observations 8,386 1,516 8,386 1,516 
Note: The values in parentheses represent p-values calculated on the basis of robust standard errors. The specifi-
cations additionally contain the same set of covariates described in the note to Table 1.  
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2000 – 2008, own calculations. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Definition and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable  Definition N Mean Standard deviation Min – Max 
ln Y Natural logarithm of an establishment’s productiv-
ity (total sales) 
8,757 14.40 2.19 8.72 –  23.11 
ln (Y
 
–W) Natural logarithm of an establishment’s profitabil-
ity (total sales minus wage bill) 
8,757 14.04 2.29 5.29 –  23.06 
%T Share of trust-based working time employees (%): 
all establishments / trust-based working time estab-
lishments 
7,999 / 
855 
1.94 / 
18.16 
8.47 / 
19.44 
0 – 97 /         
1 – 97  
%T 75 Share of trust-based working time employees (%) 
including the group-specific 75 % quantiles: all 
establishments / trust-based working time estab-
lishments 
8,734 / 
1,590 
5.06 / 
27.84 
13.89 / 
20.66 
0 – 97 /         
1 – 97  
%T 90 Share of trust-based working time employees (%) 
including the group-specific 90 % quantiles: all 
establishments / trust-based working time estab-
lishments 
8,734 / 
1,590 
6.70 / 
36.80 
18.24 / 
26.82 
0 – 97 /         
1 – 97  
ln K Natural logarithm of an establishment’s total in-
vestments 
8,757 7.46 5.78 0 – 19.67 
ln L       Natural logarithm of an establishment’s number of 
employees 
8,757 3.05 1.70 0 – 9.71 
Skilled work-
ers      
Share of skilled and high skilled workers based on 
total employment (%) 
8,757 65.61 26.56 0 – 100 
Fixed-term 
workers 
Share of fixed-term workers based on total em-
ployment (%)  
8,757 4.43 11.28 0 – 100 
Part-time 
workers 
Share of part-time workers based on total employ-
ment (%) 
8,757 20.84 24.64 0 – 100 
Apprentices Share of apprentices based on total employment 
(%) 
8,757 5.06 8.87 0 – 90.47 
Female work-
ers 
Share of female employees based on total employ-
ment (%) 
8,757 38.14 29.54 0 – 100 
 
Technical 
status 
Dummy variable calculated from an ordinal vari-
able TS ranging between 1 (technologies in use are 
out-of-date) and 5 (technologies in use are state-of-
the-art); 1 if TS ≥ 4, 0 otherwise 
8,757 0.66 0.47 0 – 1 
Expansion 
investments       
Share of an establishment’s expansion investments 
based on total investments (%) 
8,757 19.72 33.58 0 – 100 
Exports Export share on the basis of total sales (%) 8,757 7.65 18.87 0 – 100 
Collective 
wage bargain-
ing 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not estab-
lishments commit to collective wage bargaining at 
industry or firm level 
8,757 0.43 0.49 0 – 1 
Works council Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment has a works council 
8,757 0.24 0.43 0 – 1 
Extra pay Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment pays wages above the collective wage 
bargaining level 
8,757 0.20 0.40 0 – 1 
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Establishment 
age 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment has been founded before 1990 
8,757 0.52 0.49 0 – 1 
Private com-
pany 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment is managed under the legal form of a 
one-man business or a business partnership 
8,757 0.37 0.48 0 – 1 
Foreign own-
ership 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment has a non-domestic owner 
8,757 0.06 0.23 0 – 1 
Independent 
company 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment is autarkic 
8,757 0.80 0.39 0 – 1 
West German 
establishment 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment is located in West Germany 
8,757 0.60 0.48 0 – 1 
Working time 
account 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment offers the opportunity to use a working 
time account to their employees 
8,757 0.41 0.49 0 – 1 
Working at 
weekends 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not employ-
ees have to work regularly or partially at weekends 
8,757 0.79 0.40 0 – 1 
Changes in the 
working time 
of part-time 
workers 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment implements changes in the working 
time of part-time workers 
8,757 0.24 0.43 0 – 1 
Working time 
corridors 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment offers the opportunity to use working 
time corridors for their employees 
8,757 0.10 0.30 0 – 1 
Employment 
securing 
working time 
reduction 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment implements working time reduction in 
order to save jobs 
8,757 0.04 0.20 0 – 1 
Shifted work-
ing times 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment offers the opportunity to shift individ-
ual working time for their employees 
8,757 0.45 0.49 0 – 1 
M Dummy variable indicating whether or not an es-
tablishment applies formalized goal-setting proc-
esses 
8,406 0.22 0.41 0 – 1 
T%  Group-specific mean of  the share of trust-based 
working time employees (%): all establishments / 
trust-based working time establishments 
8,757 / 
1,599 
1.93 / 
23.43 
1.54 / 
11.26 
0 – 28.75 /    
3 – 57.5 
75%T  Group-specific mean of  the share of trust-based working time employees (%) including the group-
specific 75 % quantiles: all establishments / trust-
based working time establishments 
8,757 / 
1,599 
5.06 / 
27.81 
3.38 / 
15.60 
0 – 28.75 /         
3 – 65.57  
90
%T  Group-specific mean of  the share of trust-based working time employees (%) including the group-
specific 90 % quantiles: all establishments / trust-
based working time establishments 
8,757 / 
1,599 
6.68 / 
36.78 
4.42 / 
19.82 
0 – 28.75 /         
3 – 73  
Note: N is number of observations. In order to save space the information for regional, sector and time dummies 
are not displayed.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2006, own calculations. 
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Table A2. OLS Estimates of the Input Factors and Control Variables 
Dependent variable ln Y ln (Y
 
–W) 
Model specification (1) (1) 
ln K 0.021*** (0.000) 0.029*** (0.000) 
ln L 0.935*** (0.000) 0.896*** (0.000) 
Skilled workers (%) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Fixed-term workers (%) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.000) 
Part-time workers (%) -0.007*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.000) 
Apprentices (%) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.258) 
Female workers (%) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001** (0.029) 
Technical status 0.126*** (0.000) 0.144*** (0.000) 
Expansion investments (%) -0.000 (0.833) -0.000 (0.375) 
Exports (%) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.000) 
Collective wage bargaining -0.000 (0.984) -0.026 (0.345) 
Works council 0.296*** (0.000) 0.384*** (0.000) 
Extra pay 0.066*** (0.006) 0.078** (0.014) 
Establishment age -0.053*** (0.004) -0.082*** (0.001) 
Private company -0.335*** (0.000) -0.301*** (0.000) 
Foreign ownership 0.243*** (0.000) 0.324*** (0.000) 
Independent company -0.138*** (0.000) -0.154*** (0.000) 
Establishment located in West Germany 0.226*** (0.000) 0.239*** (0.000) 
Working time account -0.003 (0.842) -0.033 (0.184) 
Working at weekends -0.028 (0.208) -0.033 (0.260) 
Changes in the working time of part-time workers -0.027 (0.175) -0.029 (0.277) 
Working time corridors 0.088*** (0.003) 0.094** (0.018) 
Shifted working time 0.009 (0.600) 0.026 (0.262) 
Employment securing working time reduction -0.052 (0.135) -0.079 (0.106) 
Sector dummies yes  yes  
Constant 11.198*** (0.000) 10.916*** (0.000) 
Note: The values in parentheses represent p-values calculated on the basis of robust standard errors. The esti-
mates refer to the first column of Table 1. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2006, own calculations. 
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 Table A3. First-Stage Estimates of the Instrumental Variables Approach 
Explanatory variable to be 
instrumented %T %T
 75
 %T 90 
Model specification (2) (2) (2) 
ln K 0.065*** (0.002) 0.058* (0.077) 0.047 (0.280) 
ln L -0.482*** (0.004) -1.155*** (0.000) -1.352*** (0.000) 
Skilled workers (%) 0.008** (0.016) 0.030*** (0.000) 0.041*** (0.000) 
Fixed-term workers (%) -0.003 (0.572) 0.016 (0.180) 0.030* (0.090) 
Part-time workers (%) -0.001 (0.827) 0.008 (0.300) 0.010 (0.346) 
Apprentices (%) 0.001 (0.855) 0.006 (0.704) 0.008 (0.684) 
Female workers (%) -0.007* (0.062) -0.010 (0.131) -0.013 (0.149) 
Technical status -0.066 (0.733) 0.083 (0.784) 0.129 (0.745) 
Expansion investments (%) -0.002 (0.384) 0.004 (0.351) 0.008 (0.159) 
Exports (%) 0.005 (0.433) 0.016* (0.087) 0.024** (0.048) 
Collective wage bargaining -0.596** (0.011) -1.375*** (0.000) -2.177*** (0.000) 
Works council -0.880** (0.015) -1.196*** (0.007) -1.533*** (0.008) 
Extra pay 0.315 (0.321) 0.305 (0.445) 0.264 (0.604) 
Establishment age -0.017 (0.933) 0.573* (0.091) 0.788* (0.082) 
Private company -0.585** (0.016) -1.678*** (0.000) -2.043*** (0.000) 
Foreign ownership 1.627*** (0.008) 2.245*** (0.001) 2.647*** (0.003) 
Independent company -0.355 (0.298) -0.520 (0.218) -0.670 (0.233) 
Establishment located in 
West Germany 
1.230*** (0.000) 2.980*** (0.000) 4.133*** (0.000) 
Working time account 0.555** (0.031) -0.005 (0.987) -0.705 (0.138) 
Working at weekends 0.296 (0.217) 0.611 (0.146) 0.518 (0.357) 
Changes in the working 
time of part-time workers 
0.657** (0.029) 1.389*** (0.001) 1.652*** (0.002) 
Working time corridors 2.130*** (0.000) 3.739*** (0.000) 4.788*** (0.000) 
Employment securing 
working time reduction 
-0.318 (0.498) 0.438 (0.523) 0.988 (0.291) 
Shifted working times 0.416* (0.065) 1.710*** (0.000) 2.380*** (0.000) 
Sector dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant -0.203 (0.735) -1.267 (0.265) -1.214 (0.407) 
M 1.026*** (0.001) 1.484*** (0.000) 1.830*** (0.001) 
9075 %;%;% jkjkjk TTT  
0.848*** (0.001) 0.918*** (0.000) 0.815*** (0.000) 
Note: The values in parentheses represent p-values calculated on the basis of robust standard errors. The group-
specific mean variable jkT%  is applied in the original sample, while 
75
% jkT  and 
90
% jkT  are used in the sam-
ples extended by the respective imputed group-specific quantiles. The estimates refer to the full sample.  
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2006, own calculations. 
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Table A4. First-Stage Estimates of the Black and Lynch Approach 
Dependent variable ln Y ln (Y
 
–W) 
Model specification (3) (3) 
Estimation strategy Within estimator Within estimator 
ln K 0.006*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.000) 
ln L 0.522*** (0.000) 0.555*** (0.000) 
Year 2001 0.006 (0.101) 0.005 (0.420) 
Year 2002 0.021*** (0.000) 0.028*** (0.000) 
Year 2003 0.021*** (0.000) 0.035*** (0.000) 
Year 2004 0.021*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 
Year 2005 0.029*** (0.000) 0.055*** (0.000) 
Year 2006 0.036*** (0.000) 0.048*** (0.000) 
Year 2007 0.077*** (0.000) 0.104*** (0.000) 
Year 2008 0.095*** (0.000) 0.126*** (0.000) 
Sector dummies Yes  yes  
Constant 12.770*** (0.000) 12.291*** (0.000) 
R2 (overall) 0.836  0.752  
Number of establishments 25,800  25,800  
Number of observations 84,692  84,692  
Note: The values in parentheses represent p-values calculated on the basis of cluster-robust standard errors. The 
reference group for the time dummies is Year 2000.  
***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2000 – 2008, own calculations. 
